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Post-Conflict Experiences of Resettled Bakassi 
Peninsula People, 2006-2016
Aloysius Nyuymengka Ngalim
The Greentree Agreement of 2006 between Cameroon and Nigeria ended the conflict 
over the ownership of the oil and fish rich Bakassi Peninsula in favor of Cameroon 
and created problems for the relocated and resettled Nigerians. This article argues 
that contrary to the generally accepted theory by many scholars that heritage values 
are often the concern of displaced persons, we found that practical economic needs 
and the desire for functional participation in governance of those relocated in New 
Bakassi have been the main problems of the displacees leading to an indigenous-
incomer divide that could generate a crisis that may degenerate into intractable 
conflict. The study reveals that due to government insensitivity and corruption, 
proper resettlement for Bakassi returnees is yet to be addressed.
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Introduction
Boundary adjustments are not common features of African state territoriality. 
The colonially-ordered boundaries, despite their problems, were adopted and 
reified by postcolonial African leadership as the basis for territoriality and 
ordering postcolonial interstate relations. Indeed, the recent World Court-
ordered boundary adjustment (or settlement) between Nigeria and Cameroon is 
the exception rather than the rule. The exercise relocated settlements, moving 
some from Nigeria to Cameroon and vice versa, along the length of their shared 
1,600 km boundary. The purpose of this article is to investigate the post-conflict 
experiences of persons affected by the displacement, relocation, and resettlement 
of the vast majority of the approximately 300,000 inhabitants of the Bakassi 
Peninsula into New Bakassi in Cross River State, Nigeria. The study explores 
the factors that influenced the choice of the displaced inhabitants of Bakassi to 
relocate, the implications of resettlement or new identities on the affected people 
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of Bakassi, and how they are being effectively integrated into their communities. 
The initiatives to promote the socio-economic as well as the cultural interests of 
the affected people are analyzed and, finally, the implications of integration and 
resettlement on sustainable peace and development are examined. 
Background
The Bakassi Peninsula was the subject of a protracted dispute and an armed 
conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon over the exercise of sovereignty and 
ownership. Nigeria and Cameroon engaged in hostilities in 1972-1973 and after 
many years of low-keyed sporadic attacks by both sides; the first major use of 
direct violence took the form of a military conflict on May 16, 1981 (Konings 
2005, 290; Price 2005). In 1981, Cameroon and Nigeria were at the brink of war 
over the Bakassi Peninsula and some islands in Lake Chad. Hostilities continued 
intermittently through the 1980s and reached a tipping point in the early 1990s 
when more armed clashes were recorded between these countries over ownership 
of the Peninsula. In 1993, armed conflict in the area led to the loss of casualties 
(Ekolok n.d., 40; Konings 2005, 292). Cameroon headed to the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1994 to seek a resolution of the protracted issue. The ICJ 
decision, after years of claims and counterclaims, mandated Nigeria to transfer 
Bakassi Cameroon. Nigeria initially rejected the ruling, but later agreed to the 
terms of the Greentree Agreement, midwived by United Nations (UN) Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, to ensure peaceful compliance with the ruling of the ICJ.
According to the Agreement, Nigeria committed itself to recognize “the 
sovereignty of Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula in accordance with the 
judgment” and to “withdraw all its armed forces from the Bakassi Peninsula 
within sixty days of the date of the signing of this Agreement.” The UN Secretary-
General could extend that period but not for more than a total of thirty days. 
Cameroon, after the transfer of authority to it by Nigeria, “guarantees to Nigerian 
nationals living in the Bakassi Peninsula the exercise of the fundamental rights 
and freedoms enshrined in international human rights law and in other relevant 
provisions of international law.” Cameroon was not to expel Nigerian nationals 
from the area or force them to change their nationality. They were to be left to 
enjoy the rights to their “culture, language and beliefs…their agricultural and 
fishing activities…property and…customary land rights” among other rights (ICJ 
2002).
Notwithstanding the sustained opposition within Nigeria, Nigeria began 
the transfer of the Peninsula to Cameroon in August 2006 when Nigerian 
troops were pulled out of the northern part of the disputed territory. The 
process was concluded in 2008 when Nigeria handed over the entire Peninsula 
to Cameroonian authorities. There was strong resistance from the Bakassi 
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Movement for Self-Determination and Independence. They objected to relocation 
to other parts of Nigeria. Some of the Bakassians rejected the decision of the ICJ 
on the grounds that they were not consulted in the determination of their destiny 
and the neglect of the overwhelming desire of the affected people to remain 
Nigerian citizens. According to Honourable Essien Ayi, the representative of the 
Bakassi/Calabar South/Akpabuyo Federal Constituency at the National Assembly, 
“the GTA [Greentree Agreement] presented the Bakassi people with three hard 
choices: to remain in Bakassi and become Cameroonians; as Nigerians but live 
like immigrants and retain their Nigerian citizenship and; leave their ancestral 
homes to become eternal refugees in Nigeria” (Iriekpen and Nzeshi 2012).
In spite of the handover, the Bakassi issue was not closed until the ten year 
window for appeals allowed by the ICJ closed on October 10, 2012. Within 
Nigeria, there were heightened agitations for an appeal as the prospect of 
the perpetual loss of the Peninsula became inevitable. Civil society groups, 
opposition political parties, and some prominent Bakassi indigenes, amongst 
other interested parties, led the agitation to reclaim the Peninsula. The Nigerian 
National Assembly, particularly the Senate, was at the forefront of the movement 
to prevent the loss of the Peninsula. It passed a resolution on the eve of the appeal 
deadline urging the Nigerian government to invoke Article 61 of the ICJ Statute 
to appeal the decision in the interest of Nigerians in the affected area. However, 
the Nigerian government, during the administration of President Olusegun 
Obasanjo, refused to appeal the decision, having considered all the options 
before it. Hence, on October 10, 2012, Bakassi became an inalienable part of the 
Republic of Cameroon (Dos Santos 2014, 1-2). 
There have been several contentions that one of the bases for the failure 
of the state in Africa is the tendency for policymakers to overlook the critical 
historical, cultural, and social context of society. The neglect of the historical, 
social, and cultural context of the affected people of Bakassi in the process of 
their displacement, relocation, and resettlement could create more problems 
than solutions, especially for the bulk of the population that relocated to Nigeria. 
As the friction between original residents of Akpabuyo and the resettled people 
over access to resources deepens, conflict and violence may ensue. Indeed, 
findings revealed that the affected people are already experiencing some form 
of deprivation or the other in their new home. They have no access to fishing, 
their main occupation, as their new homes are located far from the sea; they are 
deprived of access to relief materials; and they are marginalized and oppressed. 
The affected people thus may gradually become disillusioned, disaffected, and 
tend to aggression, owing to their social and economic deprivation. On the 
other side in Bakassi, Cameroon, the Nigerians citizens, who voluntarily opted 
to remain in Cameroon face the challenge of integration into their new state. 
In March 2013, there was a new outflow of refugees from Bakassi into Nigeria 
following a spate of attacks and violence against the Nigerian population (Una 
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2013). The attacks occurred at Efut Obot Ikot village and adjoining settlements on 
the Peninsula and were provoked by a misunderstanding over fishing rights and 
tax payments, leading to the death of five people with seventeen others missing 
and the displacement of a further 1,700 people (ibid.). 
The primary research question addressed by this study centers around the 
relocation and resettlement of the affected Nigerians. Which factors influenced 
the choice of relocation and resettlement of the affected people? Four other 
sub-research questions are provided to further the understanding of the (re)
settlement and integration of the affected people into their (new) communities. 
What are the implications of resettlement on the affected people of Bakassi? 
Are the people being effectively integrated into their new communities? How 
does the process promote the socio-economic welfare as well as the cultural 
dynamics of the affected people? Will the process of integration build peace and 
promote sustainable development? 
Theoretical Framework
Relocation has been observed to lead to the loss of connections to ancestral 
and sacred sites, culture, history, and identity (Schama 1996). People who are 
displaced and thus have to relocate often experience loss of economic and social 
security (Shyamsundar and Kramer 1997). This is in line with Amos (2012) who 
highlights that displacement often leads to hunger and illness, both physical 
and mental. According to Crisp (2010), forced displacement obliges people to 
abandon their homes and seek refuge elsewhere, often at the price of serious 
threats to their welfare and rights. In a study conducted in Botswana, dominant 
social groups in the receiving communities overpowered relocated groups as the 
immigrant groups were regarded as competitors over scarce resources within the 
host communities (Bolaane 2004). In the process, they were treated as interlopers 
and denied access. 
Resettlement of displaced persons involves processes and arrangements 
planned directly by the government or private developers to address their welfare 
and security challenges. This could be achieved by choosing an area to assist the 
displaced persons replace their housing, assets, livelihood, land, and access to 
resources and services in order to restore their socio-economic, cultural, and 
political conditions (de Sherbinin, Castro, and Gemenne 2010). Resettlement 
happens recurrently in real life and there is no uncertainty that it causes major 
economic losses and cultural disruption. The core rationale for resettlement is 
to avoid protracted refugee situations by seeking to achieve durable solutions to 
the conditions of the displacees. A durable solution is a situation where displaced 
persons no longer have any specific welfare and security needs that are linked to 
their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on 
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account of their displacement (UNHCR 2011). 
The relocation and resettlement process is often controversial and imposed 
(from above) on the affected people. Isokon, Ekeh, and Icha (2014) assert that 
in most resettlement schemes, especially in Africa, the settlers were excluded 
from functional participation in the system, which made them feel a deep sense 
of neglect, abandonment, or alienation.  Government and other related agencies 
involved in resettlement rarely consult with the affected people in the process 
of resettlement (Bartolome et al. 2000; Chatty and Colchester 2003). Karanth 
(2003) argues that these agencies often lack the expertise and experience required 
to facilitate such massive and sensitive projects, leading to poor planning and 
faulty execution. Furthermore, governments and relevant agencies vested with 
these responsibilities usually fail to assess and project the long-term impacts of 
relocation and resettlement on the affected people, who are effectively abandoned 
to cater for themselves (McLean and Straede 2003; Rangarajan and Shahabuddin 
2006; Hilson, Yakovleva, and Banchirigah 2007).
Bartolome et al. (2000) observe that, in some cases, relocation and 
resettlement have recorded some measure of success as in the Kainji Dam 
resettlement in Nigeria in the late 1960s. In many other cases, owing to poor 
conception and execution, relocation and resettlement have rarely succeeded as 
the affected people are known to have retraced their steps back to the point where 
they were originally before the relocation. 
Cernea (1999) argues that relocation and resettlement engender 
“landlessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, education 
loss, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property 
and social disarticulation.” This reflects the findings of Onwe and Nwogbaga 
(2015) who report that displaced persons are exposed to a series of welfare 
and security challenges such as loss of land, loss of employment, loss of shelter, 
marginalization, increased morbidity and mortality, greater food insecurity, 
loss of access to common property/services, and social disarticulation. Added 
to this frightening reality is the inability of governments and related agencies to 
effectively provide the necessary succor and safety-nets for the affected people.
Angelovski (2015) evaluates the economic impacts, status, and needs of 
conflict affected population in the Donbass region of Ukraine. He observes 
that economic and social vulnerabilities of displaced persons are driven by 
deprivations in resources (financial, physical, human, and social). He stresses the 
need to support the productive capacities and help the affected people to meet 
their immediate needs and add to their income generation capacity. Hines and 
Balletto (2002) assess the needs of internally displaced persons in Columbia and 
are of the opinion that the displaced lose their social, legal, and economic ties and 
thus suffer considerable physical and psychological hardship. They further show 
how the World Food Programme (WFP) tried to understand and meet the food 
livelihood and security vulnerabilities of the displaced during different stages of 
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displacement in Columbia. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2018) 
discusses the economic impacts of internal displacement across dimensions, time, 
countries, and displacement contexts and reveals that protracted displacement 
increases the vulnerability and exposure of already marginal populations and 
overstretches governments’ capacities to respond. It is in this line that Das et 
al. (2016) affirms that the ultimate attainment of socio-economic stability for 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) takes years and may involve more than one 
generation. In spite of government policy and the provision of government 
funds for resettlement, IDPs may continue to suffer distress for many years after 
displacement (Ibanez and Moya 2006).
It is within this context that this study is framed; that is, to examine the (re)
settlement program of the Bakassi returnees. Drawing on the effectiveness of 
the (re)settlement program, the study also aims to examine the implications for 
sustainable peace and development in the eastern Delta of Nigeria where the 
resettlement site is located. 
Methodology
Data for this study was collected using survey research techniques in a study that 
was essentially exploratory targeting the experiences of persons affected by the 
resettlement after the Greentree Agreement. Fieldwork was conducted in New 
Bakassi in January 2013. The period of the research in Cameroon was influenced 
by weather conditions at the research sites (offshore) taking specifically into 
consideration the periods of low tides that enable easy and safe navigation across 
the channel into the Bakassi Peninsula. The study sites in Nigeria were the New 
Bakassi Local Government Area which is carved out of the Akpabuyo Local 
Government Area, resettlement camps in Ikang, Ekpiri Ikang, and Akpabuyo, and 
the Cross River State capital Calabar. Those for Cameroon were Idabato I, Idabato 
II, and Akwa. The researcher had to move forward and backwards between sites 
during field work. The Peninsula (in Cameroon) is accessible only by motor-boat 
from Oron in Nigeria as well as from Limbe in Cameroon. Akpabuyo is a few 
kilometers away from Calabar, the capital of Cross River State and is accessible by 
land transportation. 
Participants were selected using a combination of non-probability sampling 
methods. Informants were either purposively selected (as key informants) or 
selected by the accidental and snowball techniques (for other local inhabitants). 
The latter consisted of an accumulation of referrals as each informant identified 
and suggested other informants relevant to the study. These techniques make for 
evident bias in the results because it was likely that we left out some informants. 
However, this was necessitated by the fact that respondents were difficult to 
locate especially in a context where the resettlement was still unstable. Besides, 
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given that the study was undertaken just a year after the effective implementation 
of the agreement, the study is essentially an exploratory one. The results are 
thus indicative of trends and cannot be generalized. The verbal consent of 
respondents was elicited and they were assured of confidentiality with which 
the information provided would be treated. Of a total of 250 questionnaires that 
were administered, 189 were returned completed (169 Nigerians and twenty 
Cameroonians). Twenty-eight were returned uncompleted and thus rejected. 
The rest (twenty-three) were not returned at all. It is worthy to note that we will 
be dealing with the sample of Nigerians alone because they were principally 
concerned with resettlement which is the object of this article. Interviews were 
conducted with twelve key informants (leaders of civil society organizations, 
traditional rulers, government functionaries, and politicians) selected on the 
basis of their role in the relocation and (re)settlement of the affected people. Table 
1 shows the distribution of the participants’ age, marital status, level of education, 
and nationality. The bulk of participants were between thirty-five and fifty-four 
years old while persons aged sixty-five years old and above were the fewest. The 
number of respondents within the age range of twenty-five and thirty-four years 
old was higher than those who were between fifty-five and sixty-five years old. 
Regarding marital status, a large majority were married with divorcees being the 
fewest. There were more single or never married respondents than widowed.
Table 1 shows that majority of the respondents attended first cycle secondary 
or less. This was followed by persons who had reached sixth form and holders of 
Table 1. Demographic Characteristics
Variable Options F %
Age 25-34 66 32.7
35-54 106 52.5
55-65 24 11.9
65 and Above 6 3.0






First cycle secondary and below 104 55.0
Sixth form 19 10.1
University degree 7 3.7
Postgraduate degree 1 0.5
Source: Author’s Field Research
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first degrees. There was only one person with a postgraduate degree in the sample. 
The results suggest that a majority of the respondents who reside in Bakassi (new 
and old) have low levels of education. 
The researcher used local research assistants in the collection of the data. As 
most of the respondents, given their level of education, did not speak English, 
the research assistants translated and interpreted the instruments to non-English 
speaking respondents, and recorded their responses in English as well as tape-
recorded the interviews which were later transcribed into English. The research 
assistants were carefully selected from among a pool of civil society actors based 
on their knowledge of the local language and terrain as well as their familiarity 
with the issues under consideration having been involved in a number of 
commissioned studies on related issues. They were further trained based on the 
specific focus of the research and on the methods of administering of the research 
instruments. The translators’ previous experience in the area and on the subject 
enabled a certain degree of confidence in their ability to effectively capture the 
views of the respondents without bias or any significant loss of information.
The questionnaire was divided into two sections. The first section elicited 
demographic characteristics of respondents directly related to the issue under 
investigation through close-ended questions as well as open-ended questions that 
generated information regarding respondents’ view of the transfer of territory, 
their choice of relocation or settlement, as well as their view of their integration 
into their respective communities. The second elicited specific information 
regarding social disarticulation and access to developmental opportunities in 
their respective locations. Descriptive (frequencies), bar charts, as well as tests 
of association statistics (Pearson Product Moment Correlation and Multiple 
Regression Analysis) were used to describe and interpret the quantitative 
information collected. Personal observations also played an important part in 
the conduct of the research. The researcher experienced firsthand the challenges 
of the affected people. These observations form a critical part of the qualitative 
aspect of this study.
The main challenges of the fieldwork include “over-surveying” of the 
population. Being an issue of international importance, the (re)settlement of the 
Bakassi people has drawn significant international attention. As such, participants 
were rather weary and disillusioned from previous studies that did not really 
have a direct positive effect on their lives. Thus, they showed uncooperative and 
hostile attitudes toward the researcher. It was not until they were persuaded that 
the present study was not commissioned to provide solutions to their problems 
but an academic exercise aimed at identifying and analyzing the process of 
resettlement and integration that some respondents agreed to participate. The 
issue of compensation was another major hurdle for the study. This was an 
extremely difficult hurdle to overcome as many respondents would not cooperate 
without assurance of some form of compensation, which was given at the end 
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of the study. Another critical challenge for the conduct of the research was 
uncooperative government officials who demanded to vet the survey material 
before administration. This challenge was overcome in Nigeria by simply 
bypassing the official and going directly to the resettlement camps. This was a 
particularly tricky strategy as the movement of the officials had to be monitored 
to avoid a confrontation and likely untoward consequences. 
Results
Satisfaction with Resettlement 
The results presented in Figure 1 reflect Nigerian returnees’ level of satisfaction 
with the transfer of territory and their opinions regarding access to basic social 
benefits. The results indicate that a majority of Nigerians are unsatisfied with the 
decision to transfer Bakassi to Cameroon while others said they did not have 
access to social and basic development amenities. In interactive discussions with 
the relocated and “resettled” groups, they revealed that the displaced Bakassi 
indigenes were camped in dilapidated and overcrowded classrooms in Akwa 
Ikot Eyo Edem village, Akpabuyo Local Government Area of Cross River State. 
Further, they recounted that food security is a major challenge, health centers 
are without drugs, and there are no educational and economic opportunities. In 
spite of what many would describe as a kind gesture from the government, the 
“resettled” returnees described themselves as “political orphans.” One Prince 
Aston Joseph said, “I hate to hear that we have been resettled. They provided over 
2,800 households with 343 mini-flats and they call that resettlement?” (Ukwayi 
and Anam 2017). Others enjoined to attest that Bakassi people are fishermen 
and marry more than one wife and give birth to a large number of children. They 
allocated us empty houses with no facilities. The only property given to each 
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Can you imagine how a family with between eight to fifteen children will share a 
bed?… When we moved here in 2010, they only fed us for three months, and after 
that then they abandoned us. No food, no rehabilitation, no resettlement. Their talk 
of empowerment is untrue. They only brought forms for skill acquisition and we filled 
and returned to them but we haven’t heard from them ever since. None of the skill 
acquisition programmes has been implemented here (ibid.).
Effective Integration 
Table 2 presents the results of the descriptive statistics regarding people’s views 
on whether they are being well integrated into their communities or not. The 
results reveal that the majority of Nigerians felt that they were not satisfied with 
the arrangements following the Greentree Agreement. A large proportion did 
not enjoy government-led advocacy to facilitate their integration into their new 
settlements. The results thus suggest that adequate provisions were not made 
by the government of Nigeria to ensure that people were resettled and fully 
integrated into their local communities.
(Re)settlement and Socio-Economic/Cultural Dynamics 
Table 3 presents the distribution of occupations of Nigerian residents in New 
Bakassi. A majority of the residents of New Bakassi in Nigeria engage in fishing 
and farming more so than other occupations. This made it impossible for them 
to find the same opportunities in their new environments which were both 
Table 2. Effective Integration into Communities
Satisfaction with Living 
Condition Access to Basic Amenities
Government Advocacy for 
Integration
Satisfied Not Satisfied Access No Access Advocacy No Advocacy
F 11 65 71 5 28 48
% 14.5 85.5 93.4 6.6 36.8 63.2
Source: Author’s Field Research




Civil Servant 3 3.9
Others 2 2.6
Source: Author’s Field Research
 Post-Conflict Experiences of Resettled Bakassi Peninsula People, 2006-2016 115
land locked with no possibilities for either fishing or lucrative trade unlike in 
the Bakassi in Cameroon where its waters and transit plus the border area are 
fertile grounds for these activities. This explains why they were many dissatisfied 
displacees despite the amenities provided by the home government.
The results in Table 4 indicate that a larger proportion of persons resettled 
in New Bakassi claim to have changed careers or jobs after resettlement. The 
implication of the results is that the careers of many Nigerians who reside in 
New Bakassi are more affected by the resettlement process. Relocation meant 
loss of jobs which are not readily available in the new location. Ekpeyong Esong, 
who used to be a fisherman in Bakassi, reveals to Olukoya (2012) that, “life is 
very difficult for me…I no longer fish for there is no job here.” As the majority 
are engaged in fishing/farming, access to water-bodies and arable farmland 
is important. However, owing to lack of access to these resources in the New 
Bakassi, many returnees have to look for other means of livelihood.  Warfa et al. 
(2012) point out that such a situation creates financial hardship because they are 
unable to support themselves and their families on the income from menial jobs. 
Lee et al. (2015) agree that in order to provide for their families, they may work 
multiple menial jobs, and their absence from home limits the time that they are 
able to spend with their children. Many respondents told this researcher that they 
had to learn new trades to earn a living. Many others commute on foot between 
their new locations in New Bakassi and the ocean, a distance of about 10-12 miles 
in order to engage in fishing.
The results in Table 5 show that the trend of resettled Nigerians in New 
Bakassi is towards social disarticulation and deprivation occasioned by their 
relocation and resettlement. As shown elsewhere in this article, these people 
are unsatisfied with the half-hearted efforts of the Nigerian government 
regarding their resettlement in these locations. On all counts regarding social 
disarticulation, their response weighed heavily on the negative.  
The results in Table 6 illustrate the outcome of the Pearson Product Moment 
Correlation analysis between Nigerians’ decision to relocate out of or remain 
in Bakassi and the predictor variables. The results show a significant positive 
association between Nigerians’ national identity and length of stay in Bakassi and 
the choice to remain in or relocate out of Bakassi after the Greentree Agreement. 
Additionally, the results also indicated that there was a significant positive 
relationship between Nigerians’ national affiliation and the period of time they 
Table 4. People in the Same Occupation after Resettlement 
F %
Same Occupation 30 39.5
New Occupation 46 60.5
Source: Author’s Field Research
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live in Bakassi. The results suggest that Nigerians born in Bakassi and those who 
have lived in Bakassi for a long period of time are not likely to remain on Bakassi 
Peninsula after the transfer of the territory to Cameroon. This group constitutes 
the bulk of the affected people who voluntarily chose relocation and resettlement 
in Nigeria.
Table 5. Social Issues Affecting Resettled Returnees in New Bakassi 
Frequency
No. Item – % + %
1 Access to Productive Resources and Common Property 56 73.7 20 26.3
2 Access to Resources 71 93.4 5 6.6
3 Access to Landless 74 97.4 2 2.6
4 Housing 64 84.2 12 15.8
5 Dignity and Honor 67 88.2 9 11.8
6 Food Insecurity 73 96.1 3 3.9
7 Morbidity and Mortality 69 90.8 7 9.2
8 Social Disarticulation 67 88.2 9 11.8
9 Marginalization and Deprivation 69 90.8 7 9.2
10 Access to Education and other Development Opportunities 73 96.1 3 3.9
Note: “+” denotes being positively affected while “–” denotes being negatively affected
Source: Author’s Field Research
Table 6. Correlation Matrix for the Relationship between Predictor Variables and Nigerians’ 
Decision to Relocate or Remain in Bakassi
A B C D
A.  Relocate from or remain in Bakassi .762 .773
B.  Length of stay in Bakassi .762 .331
C.  Access to social amenities
D.  Nationality .773 .331
Note:  > 0.5 denotes significant positive correlation coefficients while < 0.5 denotes positive 
negative correlation coefficients.
ρAB = 0.762. Denotes a strong positive correlation between A and B
ρBD = 0.331. Indicates a weak positive correlation between B and D
ρAD = 0.773. Signifies a strong positive correlation between A and D
 The symbol ρXY signify the Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient between X and Y.
Source: Author’s Field Research
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Table 7 shows the results of the multiple regression analysis of the factors 
which predict Nigerians’ decision to relocate from or remain in Bakassi after the 
Greentree Agreement. The results indicate that length of stay in Bakassi, access 
to social amenities, and nationality jointly contributed a coefficient of multiple 
regression of .885 and a multiple correlation square of .880 towards Nigerian’s 
decision regarding whether or not to remain or relocate. The results suggest that 
88% of the total variance of Nigerian’s decision to relocate from or remain in 
Bakassi after the Greentree Agreement was accounted for by the combination of 
these explanatory variables. Moreover, the results further reveal that the analysis 
of variance of the multiple regression is significant (F = 184.703, p = .001). In 
addition, the results also showed that nationality was the most potent factor 
contributing to Nigerians’ decision regarding whether to remain in or relocate 
out of Bakassi after the Greentree Agreement. Length of stay also influenced 
the decision of the people. Access to basic social amenities did not make any 
significant contribution to Nigerians’ decision on whether to relocate or remain 
in Bakassi after the Greentree Agreement.   
Discussion 
The transfer of Bakassi Peninsula from Nigeria’s control to Cameroon based on 
the Greentree Agreement has significant implications for the affected people 
of Bakassi irrespective of their choice to remain on the Peninsula or to relocate 
and resettle in other parts of Nigeria. As shown by the study, a majority of the 
inhabitants of Bakassi, prior to the Greentree Agreement, were Nigerians. The 
Table 7. Model Summary: Coefficient and T-value of Multiple Regression Analysis of the 






B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 5.892 .305 19.293 .000
Nationality 1.025 .074 .585 13.756 .000
Access to social amenities   .011 .212 .002     .053 .958
Length of stay in Bakassi   .926 .069 .568 13.386 .000
Model Summary
Multiple R (Adjusted) = .885 Multiple R2 (Adjusted) = .880
Standard Error Estimate = .456
F = 184.703
Sig. = .000
Source: Author’s Field Research
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option presented to them was to remain and be integrated into Cameroon or 
relocate and be resettled in Nigeria. Following the Agreement, many of the 
Nigerians chose to relocate to Nigeria rather than remain and be integrated 
into Cameroon. Their choice was primarily influenced by their identification 
as Nigerians above other considerations. Indeed, some of the returnees who 
participated in the survey for this study claim that they lost their life investments 
and lots more by returning to Nigeria. They claim they would rather return to 
Nigeria than remain in Cameroon given the disposition of the Cameroonian 
gendarmes towards Nigerians on the Peninsula. Some of the victims testified that 
when they are out fishing, the gendarmes attack their women and children at 
home and have, in some cases, sent them out of their houses because they failed 
to pay taxes.
The population of the Peninsula remains significantly Nigerian, indicative 
of the fact that many inhabitants of the Peninsula of Nigerian origins opted 
to stay after the Greentree Agreement. This means that though Nigerian 
nationality was a major determinant of the decision of many people to leave 
Bakassi and be resettled in other parts of Nigeria, there were other intervening 
variables which influenced the choice of some other inhabitants to remain 
rather than relocate away from the Peninsula. Some of these variables include 
Cameroonian nationality, length of stay (by implication, level of disarticulation 
and disconnection from Nigeria) on the Peninsula, access to work, and the un-
alluring prospect and uncertainty of resettlement, amongst others. 
National affiliation correlates with the degree of satisfaction with the transfer 
of territory. A majority of Cameroonian inhabitants of the Peninsula were happy 
with the transfer of the Peninsula to Cameroon, while the majority of Nigerians 
(returnees) were unhappy with the transfer. This is quite understandable as the 
transfer compelled many Nigerians to relocate from their ancestral homes where 
they had always lived and had significant social and economic investments. 
Relocating meant an uprooting, a displacement, and destabilization of their 
settled lifestyle. It is gambling the certainty and stability of the familiar for the 
uncertainty of the unknown, which their resettlement in other parts of Nigeria 
meant. On the other hand, for the Cameroonians, Bakassi is Cameroon and home 
to them. There was no relocation to other parts of Nigeria for them. Indeed, for 
the Cameroonian, it was good that the Nigerians returned home as they would 
then have less competition for resources. For the Nigerians who chose to remain, 
their choice was influenced by their unwillingness to trade the known for the 
unknown. They have investments, either in the social life or in the booming 
fishing trade of the Peninsula. In any case, they lose nothing by remaining on the 
Peninsula as per the Greentree Agreement, they are still Nigerians, but residents 
of Cameroon.
Relocation also has implications for the living conditions of the affected 
people. While the people who remain in Bakassi did not suffer the effects of 
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disruption and the need for shelter, those who relocated to Nigeria have had 
to contend with living in camps and with limited access to basic amenities. 
Moreover, they also have to contend with loss of jobs and a not-so-receptive host 
community. They are further denied full access to the political space in their new 
local government as they have to share patronage with the host community, who 
are neither displaced nor affected by relocation. Government-led advocacy to 
ameliorate the impact of relocation and resettlement has not been effective due 
to what has been termed government insensitivity and corruption. For example, 
each affected family (irrespective of size) upon relocation to Nigeria, was paid a 
NGN$ 5000 (or US$ 33) monthly stipend by the government. This meager sum 
was unilaterally stopped without notice and explanation by the government and 
has not been provided since February of 2012. Houses earmarked for resettlement 
were either allocated to non-affected people or forcefully taken over by members 
of the host community (interview with returnees at Ekpiri Ikang, January 2013).
The affected people of New Bakassi have become despondent due to their 
perceived abandonment by the Nigerian state. They have chosen the path of 
peaceful protest to register their dissatisfaction with the government’s treatment 
of their matter. Led by the Bakassi Peoples Assembly, the affected people have 
succeeded in getting the Federal Government to set up a committee, headed by 
the Vice-President, to address the issues of concern to the people. The major 
contention of the affected people is what they call “proper resettlement” on 
Dayspring Island, where they would have access to the sea for fishing, be able to 
properly organize themselves politically, and be free of the problems posed by 
their current host community. The committee’s report, submitted in June 2013, is 
awaiting implementation by the Federal Government. The incessant insensitivity 
of the Nigerian government to the plight of the Bakassi returnees has made the 
people more frustrated and infuriated. This situation is further exacerbated by 
the indigenous-incomer divide that intensifies the marginalization of the angry 
returnees. Youngsters in displaced camps are vulnerable insurgent groups. This 
neglect could lead to insurgency and criminality given the militant activities 
causing tension already at Dayspring I and II under the aegis of Bakassi Freedom 
Fighters (BFF).
Conclusion
The arena of public policy in Africa tends to be characterized largely by a 
disconnection between policies and implementation. As noted above, this is due 
to the tendency to overlook the critical historical, cultural, and social context of 
society, which makes implementation an arduous task. In addition, relocation and 
resettlement is usually imposed (from above), without the inputs of the affected 
people. The consequence is that the goals of relocation and resettlement become 
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hard to accomplish.
This has played out in the resettlement of the affected people of Bakassi 
in Nigeria. It appears as though the Nigerian state was ill-prepared for the 
resettlement as the people have been largely left to their own devises with 
insignificant government intervention to make their integration into their new 
communities smooth and effective. This has pitched the incomers against the 
host community in Akpabuyo, with the affected people claiming marginalization, 
redirection of relief materials, and denial of access to the political space and 
government patronage. The lives of the affected people have been disrupted with 
little or no intervention to effectively resettle them. The majority have changed 
occupations as they can no longer engage in fishing; some have been trained 
in new skills, but without access to capital they could not invest their skills in 
productive ventures. Tension and mutual distrust have thus grown between the 
affected people and the host community. Had the affected people reacted based 
on their level of discontent, conflict would have flared in New Bakassi. 
On the Bakassi Peninsula, the fortunes of the people are slightly different. 
Though access to social amenities is limited, the people do not have to contend 
with the disarticulation and disruption associated with relocation characterized 
by the loss of shelter, jobs, etc., and having to endure the ignominy of camp 
accommodation and relying on handouts to meet the basic needs of their 
families. While the Nigerian returnees have limited access to the political 
space, their Cameroonian counterparts, especially Nigerian residents, suffer 
disenfranchisement as they are deprived civic rights as well as access to other 
resources of state.
Greater government involvement is required in both countries to ease the 
issues associated with both relocation and resettlement as well as of integration 
into new communities or integration as new members. Effective government-
led advocacy is required to educate the affected people of their civic rights and 
responsibilities as well as an initiative to engender the socio-economic and 
political integration of new members into the community. The reduction of 
the impacts of the trauma associated with the loss of livelihood, homes, and 
settlement would promote the rate of integration. Similarly, inclusion initiatives 
to promote the integration of new members would aid their acceptance as well as 
their sense of belonging.
Furthermore, to defuse tensions that have built up between the two 
countries, it is important to promote the virtues espoused in the Greentree 
Agreement. Owing to recent developments that led to a new outflow of people of 
Nigerian descent from Bakassi Peninsula to Nigeria due to conflict between them 
and Cameroonian gendarmes, Bakassi may not be a settled issue yet. Rather than 
stoke the embers of interstate conflict, Bakassi should be considered a testament 
to peaceful resolution of boundary conflict between two African states. The 
Mixed Commission should be retained as an ad hoc commission to deal with 
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unresolved issues along this boundary.
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